Who Opposes Ethnic Minority Candidates?
Examining the Moderated Effects by Voter Ideology and Ethnic Group Attitudes[1]

MURAKAMI Go[*]

1. Introduction

In the previous volume of this journal, I showed that ethnic minority candidates could suffer potential penalties on their vote share, if they ran for office in Japan, and that partisans would be more likely to avoid supporting them (Murakami 2019). One noteworthy finding is that significant electoral penalties were observed among any partisans of the four major parties then (Liberal Democratic Party, hereafter shortened as LDP, Democratic Party [DP], Japan Innovation Party [JIP] and Japanese Communist Party [JCP]). If party difference does not matter much, what does? In other words, who is more (or less) likely to avoid voting for ethnic minority candidates? To understand the nature of the effect of candidates' ethnicity on vote choice, one should explore and identify key voter characteristics that moderate the effect.

This paper examines voters' demographic backgrounds (gender, age and education) and their two dispositions as key moderators. First, following the finding in previous studies that ethnic minority candidates are seen ideologically liberal, I examine if conservative voters oppose ethnic minority candidates more than liberal voters. Second, following the theory of prejudice, which explains that one's prejudice against social outgroups leads to negative reactions to their members, I examine if voters with negative feeling towards ethnic minority groups oppose ethnic minority candidates more than voters with positive feeling.

To assess these theoretical predictions, I use two experiments conducted in 2011 and

2017 in Japan. In both experiments, eligible Japanese were asked to vote for a candidate in a mock general election. A target candidate's ethnicity was manipulated (Japanese, Korean or Chinese), and a different candidate condition was randomly assigned to each participant. As I reported elsewhere (Murakami 2014, 2019), some electoral penalties were observed when the target candidate was presented as non-Japanese. In this paper, I focus on two major findings about moderated effects. First, the negative effect of the candidate's ethnicity was moderated by participants' self-rated ideology, but its level was modest at best: the conservatives were slightly more likely to oppose the non-Japanese candidate than the centrists, but not more so than the progressives. Second and in contrast, the negative effect was strongly moderated by participants' group attitudes towards ethnic minorities: those with negative feeling towards Korean and Chinese residents in Japan avoided voting for the non-Japanese minority candidate much more than those with neutral or positive feeling towards them.

Below I show two theoretical expectations of who would oppose (or support) ethnic minority candidates in making their vote decision. In the third section, the design of two survey experiments is briefly explained, followed by models and method of analysis. In the result section, moderated effects are compared in two experiments. Then in the last section, findings are summarized, and their implications are discussed.

2. Literature review and theories

An increasing number of studies examine whether candidates' ethnicity influence vote choice in elections, but their results are still inconclusive: some showed that a substantive number of voters with ethnic majority backgrounds avoid voting for ethnic minority candidates (Besco 2018; Fisher et al. 2015; Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau 2010; Murakami 2014, 2019; Piston 2010; Terkildsen 1993; Thrasher et al. 2017), whereas others suggested only few do so (Brouard, Deiss-Helbig, and Dageförde 2018; Brouard and Tiberj 2010; Highton 2004; Hood and Mckee 2015; Sigelman et al. 1995; Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013; Street 2014; Weaver 2012). This is puzzling, when many scholars who examined this effect commonly predicted that voters would oppose ethnic minority candidates, because many of them have negative views towards ethnic minorities. One likely answer to this puzzle lies in voter heterogeneity. That is, some voters are less inclined to support ethnic minority candidates, whereas others are *more willing* to do so, and when these two forces put together, they cancel each other (Tesler and Sears 2010, 51). If voters' response to candidates' ethnicity is heterogeneous, the next task is to find out and examine specific voter characteristics that moderate the effect. In other words, we should identify moderator variables: who opposes ethnic minority candidates, and who else supports them?

To identify moderator variables, we need theories of why and how candidates' ethnic minority backgrounds influence voters' choice. In examining perceptions of racial minority

candidate in the US, Moskowitz and Stroh (1994) provided two such theoretical explanations. The first one is that voters directly translate their prejudice against ethnic minority groups into their evaluation of minority candidates. The other is that voters do so indirectly by forming biased perceptions of policy conflicts between the candidates and themselves (Moskowitz and Stroh 1994, 309–13). Below I clarify the logic of these explanations to identify two voter characteristics that moderate the effect of candidates' ethnicity.

2.1. Attitudes towards ethnic minority group

Moskowitz and Stroh's (1994) first explanation is based on theories on racism and prejudice against African Americans (hereafter Black) in the US context. Simply put, "summary, negative feelings and stereotypes translate into disparaging assessments of black candidates" (p. 309). Prejudice is defined generally as "a negative attitude toward a group or toward members of the group", and stereotype as "knowledge structures that serve as mental 'pictures' of the groups in question" (Stangor 2009, 2)[2]. Indeed many works that showed electoral penalties for minority candidates focused on voters' prejudice against or stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities (Highton 2011; Piston 2010; Street 2014) or ethnocentrism (Kam and Kinder 2012), and they all seem to assume, often implicitly, a simple mechanism of translating prejudice into vote choice. The rationale for this assumption seems supported by several studies in social psychology. They found that prejudice against and stereotypes about ethnic minority groups are spontaneously activated in presence of their members or relevant cues (Devine 1989; Kawakami, Dion and Dovidio 1998). When activated, prejudice and stereotypes are often used in making conscious decisions or judgments involving relevant groups or members, especially by those with the higher level of prejudice (Bodenhausen and Wyer 1985; Dovidio et al. 1997; Fazio 1990).

In voting, a presence of ethnic minority candidates is highly likely to activate voters' prejudice and stereotypes about relevant ethnic groups, when they do not know much about the candidates. Accordingly, their prejudice against the ethnic minority groups to which the candidates are perceived to belong can guide people to avoid voting for them. Because prejudice is generally conceived as negative attitudes towards social groups, we should expect the following moderated effects: voters with negative feeling towards the relevant ethnic minority groups to the candidates should be more likely to oppose ethnic minority candidates than those with neutral or positive feeling towards the groups.

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[2] Stereotypes (cognition) and prejudice (attitudes) are related but distinct concepts, and scholars do not agree on specific issues of their definitions (Stangor 2009, 2–4). Some other definitions focus more on the relationship among social groups. For example, Dovidio et al. (2010) define prejudice as "an individual-level attitude […] toward groups and their members that creates or maintains hierarchical status relations between groups" (2010, 7), and stereotypes as "associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group" (2010, 8).

2.2. Policy and ideological concerns

Moskowitz and Stroh's (1994) another argument relies on the cognitive balance theory. They argue that "the voter misperceives the candidate's position on a policy because of his or her predisposition against the candidate's race" (p. 311). To oppose ethnic minority candidates in this manner however, voters do not need to "misperceive" candidates' policy positions, nor do they need to be prejudiced against minorities. Voters, prejudiced or not, can support or oppose ethnic minority candidates if they perceive that the candidates bear specific policy or ideological orientations, regardless of the validity of their judgment. Several studies provided evidence for such (often biased) perceptions. In the US for examples, White voters tend to perceive Black candidates as ideologically more liberal than the comparable White candidates (Jacobsmeier 2014; Lerman and Sadin 2016; McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995). In Japan, I reported elsewhere that Japanese voters perceived hypothetical Korean candidates as endorsing policies that would benefit their co-ethnic minorities in Japan, regardless of the candidate's stated position (Murakami 2014). In a broader sense, voters are likely to use candidates' ethnic minority backgrounds as a cognitive heuristic indicating liberal ideology. If so, voters' response to candidates' ethnicity should be different depending on their own ideological dispositions. Based on a simple spatial proximity model of voting (Enelow and Hinich 1984; Jessee 2012), we expect that the ideologically conservatives should be more likely to oppose ethnic minority candidates than the centrists or liberals (Jacobsmeier 2015). We may even expect that the ideologically liberals are more likely to *support* ethnic minority candidates for their ideological proximity.

To summarize, two moderators, voters' ethnic group attitudes and ideology, are identified to theoretically explain who is more likely to oppose ethnic minority candidates in elections. The first hypothesis posits that the effect of the candidates' ethnicity on vote choice is negative and larger for voters with negative attitudes towards ethnic minority groups than for those with neutral or positive attitudes. The second hypothesis posits that the effect is negative and larger for conservative voters than for ideologically centrist or liberal voters.

3.   Research design and method

In order to examine the two moderated effects of candidates' ethnicity, I compare the result of two experiments conducted at different time in Japan. Both studies were conducted online, and the participants were sampled and recruited by Nikkei Research from their Nikkei Access Panel monitors so that they approximated the gender and geographic distribution of the eligible voters in Japan. Below I briefly explain each protocol in order.

3.1. Study 1: Two-candidate race with policy views

The first study was conducted in November 2011, when the Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter DPJ) was in power. A total of 3,309 eligible Japanese (aged between 20 and 70)

participated in this survey with the response rate of 30.9 percent[3]. Before exposed to the experimental part of this study, participants answered various questions on Japanese politics, economy, society and the diplomatic relations with other countries, which included questions on the level of trust in Koreans and Chinese residents in Japan (the first key moderator) and another on their own ideological position (the second key moderator). The trust questions were embedded in a series of other related questions on "foreign residents" (*gaikokujin*) in Japan, and asked if participants think "almost all the people of that group" are trustworthy or not on a 7-point scale from "not trustworthy" to "trustworthy". This question asked specifically about four groups of *Zainichi* Koreans, recent immigrants from South Korea, *Zainichi* Chinese and immigrants from China, respectively. The ideology question asked participants to rate their own position on a typical 11-point scale from "progressive" to "conservative." The wordings of these questions are available in Appendix B.

After answering these questions, participants voted in a mock election. First, they were instructed to suppose that two new candidates were competing for office in their local (single-member) district in the next House of Representatives election. Then on the next page the candidates were introduced with their pictures, short bios (descriptions of their family, education and career backgrounds) and policy views[4]. They were instructed to read the texts, give their impressions of the candidates and then vote for one or abstain. Finally, participants answered their partisanship and demographic backgrounds including gender, age and education at the end of the survey.

On the candidate introduction page, both candidates were described as around 50-year-old men with high level of educational backgrounds and a prestigious career. In the same texts each candidate succinctly expressed his views on Japanese economy, pension, tax and immigration policies. Two versions of the policy views were constructed from the LDP's and DPJ's official platforms (manifesto) used in the 2009 and 2010 elections so that they consistently mirrored the party's average policy orientations. Either one of the two candidate-platform combinations was randomly assigned to each participant. In other words, participants saw one candidate expressing his view along the LDP's policy platform, whereas the other expressing his view along the DPJ's policy platform. Aside from this

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3) The response rate was calculated based on the 10,709 individuals who were randomly sampled from the Nikkei Access Panel monitors and asked to participate in the survey by e-mails. The survey was implemented as a part of the larger research project, "A Study of Japanese Preference Formation in Foreign Policy" managed by Professor Masaru Kohno. I appreciate Professor Kohno for sharing the survey space and the data.

4) Both pictures were purchased through a commercial web site. Each candidate had one of the pictures, and one of two candidate-picture combinations was randomly assigned to each participant. The target candidate was preferred more, when one picture was assigned over the other, but considering the random assignment of pictures and the triviality of this manipulation, the discussion on the effect of pictures are hereafter omitted.

platform manipulation, partisan context and candidates' party label were also randomly and independently assigned to each participant. About one-third saw two candidates competing without any partisan label (non-partisan context), whereas the other two-thirds saw an LDP candidate competing with a DPJ candidate (partisan context). For this detail, see Table 1 and full texts of the candidate introduction in Appendix A.

A crucial feature of this study is the manipulation of the candidate's ethnicity. In Study 1, one of two candidates (hereafter the target candidate) was shown either as Korean (ethnic minority) or implicitly Japanese, and one of these two conditions was randomly assigned to each participant. The ethnicity of the target candidate was manipulated by changing the pronunciation of his name and by adding descriptions to his bio that he was born "as a *Zainichi* Korean" and "naturalized to become a Japanese citizen" in his 20s. The target candidate's name was pronounced as *Sēichi Hayashi* (a typical Japanese name) in the control group, whereas the same name was pronounced as *Sung-Il Lim* (a Korean-sounding name) in the treatment group. The other candidate's name, *Kōichi Suzuki* was held constant so that participants presume him as ethnically Japanese. Because (1) the target candidate's ethnicity, (2) both candidates' short bio and platform and (3) the partisan context were independently manipulated, combinations of these produce 8 conditions (2 x 2 x 2). In addition, (4) the candidates' partisanship was manipulated only under the partisan context. Thus the total number of experimental groups resulted in 12 conditions (see Table 1), one of which was randomly assigned to each participant.

3.2. Study 2: Four-candidate race without policy views

The Study 2 uses the same data as my previous study did (Murakami 2019). A total of 6,911 eligible Japanese (aged between 20 and 79) participated in this study in February 2017, when the LDP was in power. Before voting in a mock House of Representative election, participants answered various questions including their gender, age, partisanship and the two moderator questions[5]. In the main experimental component, participants saw a list of four candidates in a table with a short description for each candidate. Then they were asked to give their impressions of each candidate and to vote for one or abstain. Participants' educational backgrounds were asked at the end of the survey.

There are four major differences between Study 1 and 2: the number of candidates (four-candidate race in Study 2); the variation in partisanship context (a four-party competition of LDP, DP, JIP and JCP in all conditions); the amount of information about the candidates (a much shorter bio without platform); and the variation in the target candidate's ethnicity (Korean, Chinese or Japanese). Compared to Study 1, much less information about the candidates was available in Study 2, only their name and

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5) In the self-rated ideology question, a randomly chosen half of the participants saw a "liberal-conservative" scale instead of the "progressive-conservative" scale. Because this manipulation did not produce significant differences in moderated effects, they are grouped together in the analysis section.

pronunciation, year of birth, naturalization record (only in a treatment group) and political party. No detailed biographic information (pictures, educational attainment or past career) or policy views were provided. Similarly to Study 1, the target candidate's name was *Sēichi Hayashi* in the control group, but the name in the treatment group was either *Sung-Il Lim* (Korean) or *Cheng-Yi Lin* (Chinese) in Study 2. For this detail, see Appendix A in the previous volume of this journal (Murakami 2019, 66). Combinations of 1) four conditions of the target candidate's party affiliation and 2) three conditions of his ethnicity created 12 conditions in total, one of which was randomly assigned to each participant. Table 1 summarizes and compares the experimental conditions in both studies.

Table 1. Summary of experimental conditions in two studies

	The target candidate's backgrounds:				
Exp. group	Study 1			Study 2	
	Ethnicity	Platform	Party	Ethnicity	Party
1	Japanese	LDP	(Non-partisan)	Japanese	LDP
2	Korean	LDP	(Non-partisan)	Korean	LDP
3	Japanese	DPJ	(Non-partisan)	Chinese	LDP
4	Korean	DPJ	(Non-partisan)	Japanese	DP
5	Japanese	LDP	LDP	Korean	DP
6	Korean	LDP	LDP	Chinese	DP
7	Japanese	DPJ	LDP	Japanese	JIP
8	Korean	DPJ	LDP	Korean	JIP
9	Japanese	LDP	DPJ	Chinese	JIP
10	Korean	LDP	DPJ	Japanese	JCP
11	Japanese	DPJ	DPJ	Korean	JCP
12	Korean	DPJ	DPJ	Chinese	JCP

3.3. Models and the method of estimation

Following the method adopted in my previous studies (Murakami 2014, 2019), I use a logistic regression to analyze the data with the dependent variable of voting for a target candidate (1 if participants voted for Hayashi, Lim or Lin) or otherwise (0), including abstentions and refusals in both studies. The crucial independent variable is the target candidate's ethnicity manipulation captured by a dummy variable of ethnic Japanese (0) or non-Japanese (1). The estimands of interests are the averaged difference in the proportion of voting for the target candidate between these two groups, conditional on the moderator variables. The first key moderator, the prejudice against the relevant ethnic minority group, was measured by the level of trust in ethnic minorities. The second key moderator was measured by the participant's self-rated ideology. Because the responses to the trust questions on *Zainichi* Koreans, Chinese and immigrants from South Korea and China were

strikingly similar (alpha of .87 in Study 1 and .89 in Study 2), their scores were summed up and standardized to range from 0 (the lowest level of trust) to 1 (the highest). On the ideology question, relatively large number of participants (approximately 7% in Study 1 and 8% in Study 2 in the model) answered that they "didn't know" their own ideology. Thus their response was transformed into four categories of don't knows, the progressives (those who chose between 0 and 4 on the 11-point scale), centrists (5) and the conservative (between 6 and 10). To capture other moderations, I also included three demographic variables of participants' gender, age group and educational backgrounds as additional moderators. In other words, I interacted all these moderators with the candidate's ethnicity dummy and included them in the same model to explain participants' vote choice. To articulate this model:

$$\Lambda(Y) = a_0 + \beta E + \gamma_t P_t + \delta_t E * P_t + \zeta_i PID_i + \eta_{t,i} P_t * PID_i \\ + \theta_j X_j + \iota_j E * X_j$$

where $\Lambda(Y)$ is a logistic function of $\log_e \left(\frac{\Pr(Y=1)}{1 - \Pr(Y=1)} \right)$, and Y is the vote choice. The notations β, γ, δ, ζ, η, θ, and ι are coefficients of the variables introduced in the model. E represents the target candidate's ethnicity dummy (1 if non-Japanese). Numbers in subscript t, i and j distinguish categories of the same type of variables. For example, P_t represents dummy variables of the candidate's party-platform conditions ($1 \leq t \leq 5$, $t \in N$), and in Study 1, the first dummy variable P_1 ($t=1$) takes the value of 1 if the target candidate is a non-partisan candidate with LDP's platform and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the second dummy variable P_2 is 1 if non-partisan candidate with the DPJ's platform, the third P_3 is 1 if LDP candidate with the LDP's platform, and so on. PID_i are participants' partisanship dummies ($1 \leq i \leq 6$, $i \in N$), and in Study 1, they are LDP, DPJ, Komei or other partisan dummies, whereas the non-partisans is a base category. In Study 2, LDP, DP, JIP, JCP, Komei and other partisan dummies. X_j are moderator variables ($1 \leq j \leq 11$, $j \in N$. For these 11 variables, see Appendix C). The interaction term of the candidate's ethnicity and party conditions ($E*P_t$) captures varying effects of the candidate's ethnicity by different partisanship and platform conditions. Similarly, the interaction term of P_t*PID_i captures the difference in the baseline partisan support, when the target candidate was co-partisan for participants. Finally, the interaction term of $E*X_j$ captures the moderated effects of the candidate's ethnicity by participants' gender, age group, educational backgrounds, ethnic trust and ideology. Because the most estimands are not of the interests of this study, they are not reported in the analysis section. Instead, I focus on the marginal effects of the candidate's ethnicity moderated by participants' demographic variables, ethnic group attitudes and ideology. All the moderated effects were estimated by calculating the marginal differences—changes in the probability of voting for the target candidate for a change in the target candidate's ethnicity (from Japanese to non-Japanese backgrounds) with fixing the values of a specific moderator variable each time. The values of the other moderator variables in the model were left as

observed in calculating specific moderated effects.

4. Results

Before examining the moderated effects, I first describe the average treatment effects of the candidates' ethnicity on vote choice in two studies. Using the statistical model described above, the average effects of changing the target candidate's ethnicity from Japanese to non-Japanese (Korean and Chinese) were estimated -.039 (p=.04, N=2,217) in Study 1 and -.095 (p<.001, N=5,219) in Study 2. This means that participants were less likely to vote for the target candidate when he had non-Japanese backgrounds than when he had Japanese backgrounds by about 4 percentage points in Study 1, and by about 10 points in Study 2. Note that the effect size varies by partisan context, the target candidate's partisanship, his expressed policy views, participants' partisanship, and their combinations. These details were reported elsewhere (Murakami 2014, 2019). In the following, I focus on how the effects vary by participants' demographic characteristics first, and then by the level of trust in ethnic minority groups as well as their ideology.

4.1. Moderated effects by gender, age and education

Figure 1 summarizes the moderated effects of the candidate's ethnicity on vote choice by participants' gender, age and educational backgrounds in two studies. The point estimates in Study 1 (2011) are indicated by black circles, and those in Study 2 (2017) by gray squares. The wings represent 95% confidential intervals. A vertical sold line on the right represents the point at which the effect is zero, a dashed line next to the zero line represents the average treatment effect for Study 1 (-.039), and a vertical dotted line on the left represents the effect for Study 2 (-.095).

Overall, no demographic variable strongly moderate the effect of the candidate's ethnicity in either study. With an exception of the larger negative effect for those in their 50s in Study 1 (b=-.099, p=.018), many other point estimates hover around the average effect lines in both studies. In particular, the effect for men are slightly smaller than the effect for women (b=-.084 for men and b=-.110 for women in Study 2), which suggests that women opposed the non-Japanese candidate more than men did. Yet this gender difference is still small and statistically insignificant (p=.15 in Study 2). No logical pattern was observed among different age groups, when the younger participants opposed the ethnic minority candidate as much as the older ones did. Finally, those who completed a university degree were slightly more likely to oppose the candidate than those who finished high school or junior college. But again the difference by their educational backgrounds remains small. Overall, Figure 1 suggests no clear, consistent patterns of moderation by participants' gender, age and education in two studies.

Figure 1. Moderated effects of candidates' ethnicity by gender, age and education

4.2. Moderated effects by ideology and trust in ethnic minority groups

Figure 2 summarizes the moderated effects by participants' level of trust in ethnic minorities (upper side) and by their self-rated ideology (lower side). First in both studies, the effect is clearly moderated by the trust in ethnic minorities. For example in Study 2, the effect for those with the lowest level of trust (0) is -.15 point, whereas the effect for those with the highest level of trust (1.0) is +.06 point (both $p<.001$). This trend is even clearer in Study 1. The estimated effect is zero for those with the moderately higher level of trust (0.6) than the average (0.45), whereas the effect is -.17 points for those with the lowest level of trust. Thus, people with negative attitudes towards the relevant ethnic minority groups opposed the ethnic minority candidate more than those with positive attitudes did.

Second, the effect is moderated by participants' self-rated ideology to a certain degree. The bottom of Figure 2 shows that the conservatives opposed the ethnic minority candidate more than the centrists did. In Study 2, the stronger negative effect is observed for the conservatives ($b=-.12$, $p<.001$) than for the centrists ($b=-.07$, $p<.001$) or the liberals/progressives ($b=-.08$, $p<.001$). These differences are marginally statistically significant ($p=$ .04 and .06). In Study 1, the smaller negative effect ($b=-.06$, $p=.038$) is observed for the conservatives, whereas the effect for the centrists is indistinguishable from zero ($b=.027$, $p=$ .55). The effect for the progressives is negative at -.04 ($p=.243$) however, and none of these estimated effects are statistically distinguishable (all $p>.10$). Accordingly, an ideology moderation hypothesis is weakly supported: the conservatives often opposed ethnic minority candidates more than the centrists but the difference in the effect was small[6].

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6) In a separate model, I examined the moderated effects of ideology with 6 categories by dividing ↗

Figure 2. Moderated effects of candidates' ethnicity by group attitudes and ideology

5. Summary and discussion

In this paper, I examined moderated effects of candidates' ethnicity on vote choice using two survey experiments conducted in Japan in 2011 and 2017. Many aspects of the experiments were different−governing party at the time, public support for the government and parties, design of the experiments and the overall effect size as the result. Yet several common patterns emerged in two studies. First, after controlling for the two key moderations, the effect of changing the target candidate's ethnicity on vote choice was not strongly moderated by participants' gender, age or education. Second, a hypothesis that people's ideology moderates the effect was partially supported. In both studies, the conservatives opposed the ethnic minority candidate more than the centrists did, but in Study 1 the progressives also opposed the candidate as strongly as the conservatives did. Third, the other hypothesis that people's negative attitudes towards relevant ethnic minority group moderates the effect was strongly supported in both studies. Participants with the lower level of trust in Korean and Chinese residents in Japan opposed the ethnic minority candidate far more than those with the moderate or higher level of trust. Accordingly, these results together suggest that the distribution of voters' group attitudes towards ethnic minorities, rather than their ideological division play a key role in determining the effect size of candidates' ethnicity on vote choice.

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the progressives and conservatives into moderate and radical ones respectively. The results remained by and large the same.

The findings imply that many voters' opposition to candidates' ethnicity can result from their direct translation of their prejudice against ethnic minority groups into their vote choice. When it is difficult for people to suppress their prejudice against ethnic groups in facing their members, opposing the minority candidate is their intuitive reaction, especially among those with the higher level of prejudice. The findings do not reject Moskowitz and Stroh's (1994) second explanation however, that the prejudiced voters have a biased perception about the candidate's policy position or ideology, which leads to opposing the candidate. Indeed, many voters may consider the policy or ideological implications of the candidates' ethnicity, but linking that information to the abstract ideological structure in a country and to their own ideological position needs cognitive resources and knowledge. How the ethnic politics is structured in partisan and ideological confrontations in a country should also influence significantly how and to what degree the people's group attitudes moderate this effect. Future research should investigate the causal mechanism and its relation to the moderation by voters' group attitudes.

There are some limitations in this study, and one important concern is a potential threat to the external validity. Strong moderations by participants' ethnic group attitudes were observed probably due to the artificial setting of the experiment, more specifically the lower information election contexts. If so, the moderated effect in real elections could be much weaker when voters have more political information or better understanding about ethnic minority candidates. While this possibility cannot be rejected, a comparison of the moderated effects by group attitudes between Study 1 and 2 suggests otherwise. The degree to which participants' trust in ethnic minorities moderates the effect was larger in Study 1 than in Study 2, whereas far more information about the candidates, even their policy views, was provided in Study 1 than in Study 2. To examine the external validity of the findings in this paper, future research should investigate what people know about, or even if they are aware of existing ethnic minority candidates in real elections.

6.   References

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7. Appendix

Appendix A. Experimental manipulation in Study 1.

Introduction: "Please assume that you are a constituent of a single-member district of the next general election of the House of Representatives, and that two candidates are planning to run in that district. We will introduce a profile and platform of those candidates. After you review their introduction, you will be asked about your impression, your voting intention, and so on. Please read the following information about two candidates below and check the buttons to proceed."

The candidates' bio and policy views #1: LDP's policy orientation

Born in 1960 [as a Zainichi Korean]. [Naturalized to become a Japanese citizen in 1982.] Studied Economics for his undergraduate and graduate degree and obtained M.A. in Economics. Worked in the investment department of the major bank between 1985 and 1998. In 1998, he ran an IT-solution company, became a chief executive officer, and has worked for 12 years to provide IT business to other companies. Married with his wife in 1988 and has a son and a daughter.

The pension plan should be reviewed and improved so that the level of the allowance stays. In order to do so, we need to have an overhaul of the entire social welfare system with the budget and its financial resources. In order to respond the increasing social welfare costs in the future, we need a fundamental reform of the tax system, including increasing the consumption tax.

The current Japanese economy has lost its energy. In order to regain the vital Japan, we need to nurture new innovations as well as to enhance the international competitiveness of our industry. For that purpose, we need to decrease the corporate tax, and promote accepting immigrants with the highly technical skills.

Having said that, granting the local election suffrage to the permanent residents (foreigners) is the critical issue that affects the basis of our sovereignty and our democracy. I oppose passing the bill that grants suffrage to foreigners at the local level immediately.

The candidates' bio and policy views #2: DPJ's policy orientation

Born in 1961 [as a Zainichi Korean]. [Naturalized to become a Japanese citizen in 1982.] Majored law in the University and passed the national bar exam in 1984. Worked as a lawyer in a law firm, specializing in the labor dispute issue. In 1999 he ran for the local municipal Council and has been elected for three times. Married with his wife in 1989 and have a daughter and two sons.

The pension programs should be unified/integrated so that everyone can receive the minimum pension allowance and live the stable elder life. In order to stabilize its budget, the equivalent amount of the entire revenue of the current 5% consumption tax is allocated to the pension as the source of budget that secure this minimum allowance.

The current Japanese economy has lost the environment that average/ordinary people can work with the sense of security. We should build better safety net and expand the policies to help laborers so that everyone can work with breath of life and make a

living. For that purpose, we need to reorganize and switch from the current tax system which benefits the higher income group relatively more, to tax deduction, allowance and tax credit with allowance.

Further, in order to be internationally competitive and make Japan more open to other countries, we will improve the environment and the legal framework for foreign labors and permanent residents (foreigners).

Appendix B. Survey question wording and answer options in Study 1 and 2.

Vote choice (Dependent variable).
"If you were to vote in this election, which candidate would you like to vote?" (Study 1)
"If these candidates ran in the single-member district in the House of Representatives election, which candidate/party would you like to vote for?" (Study 2)

[Answer options: the order of candidates is randomized]
1. Sēichi Hayashi / Sung-Il Lim; 2. Kōichi Suzuki; 3. Abstain; 4. Don't want to answer (Study 1);

1. Sēichi Hayashi / Sung-il Lim / Cheng-yi Lin (party name); 2. Kōichi Suzuki (party name); 3. Yutaka Shimizu (party name); 4. Tōru Katō (party name); 5. Abstain; 6. Don't want to answer (Study 2).

Trust in ethnic minority groups (group attitudes).
"Using the scale below, where would you rate the following ethnic groups in Japan on each characteristic? For example, a score of 1 of the first characteristics 'Trustworthy/Not trustworthy' means that you don't think almost the people of that group are trustworthy, whereas a score of 7 means that you think almost all the people of the group are trustworthy, and the score of 4 means neither trustworthy or not trustworthy." (Study 1 and 2).

[Answer items]
Zainichi Koreans; Recent immigrants from South Korea to Japan; *Zainichi* Chinese; Recent immigrants from China to Japan.

[Answer options]
1. Not trustworthy; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7. Trustworthy; 8. Don't know; 9. Don't want to answer.

Self-rated ideology.

"Terms such as 'conservative' and 'progressive' (/'liberal'), are often used to describe political positions. If 0 is the most progressive (/liberal), and 10 is the most conservative, what number do you think best indicates your own position? Please enter a number from 0 to 10" (Either 'progressive' or 'liberal' is randomly assigned in Study 2. All participants saw 'progressive' in Study 1).

[Answer option]
0. Progressive (/Liberal); 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10. Conservative.

Appendix C. Descriptive statistics of the dependent and moderator variables.

Variable	Study 1		Study 2	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Vote for the target candidate (DV)	.302	.459	.114	.318
Gender (male=1)	.566	.496	.568	.495
Age group:				
20s	.173	.378	.103	.304
30s	.212	.409	.152	.359
40s	.188	.390	.184	.387
50s	.204	.403	.172	.378
60s+70s	.222	.416	.389	.488
Education:				
High school	.196	.397	.245	.430
Technical school or college	.196	.397	.183	.387
University	.598	.490	.559	.497
Ideology:				
"Don't know"	.070	.256	.083	.276
Progressive	.305	.461	.247	.431
Center	.160	.366	.172	.378
Conservative	.465	.499	.498	.500
Trust in ethnic minority groups	.454	.267	.323	.247

Notes: All the variables range from 0 to 1.